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(EURATOM): THE LIMITS OF
SUPRANATIONALISM
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Among the reasons for the development of the European
Atomic Energy Community-the expense of nuclear research, the
scarcity of trained scientists and the need for uniformity in inspec-
tion, health and safety rules was the further thought that nuclear
energy was a good area for the development of a supranational en-
tity since there was the possibility of a crisis in the study of fuel for
Europe and cooperative positive action was necessary. As it
turned out, the crisis did not materialize and the nationalistic de-
sires of the Member States re-manifested themselves to a great
extent making the original hopes for Euratom fade. However,
there was still great pressure for the development of a suprana-
tional institution, and it is the scope of this article to consider the
limits of that supranationalism.
I
If . . . Euratom seems beyond whatever precedents interna-
tional public law has to offer and appears to remain short of
federal processes, the nature of the new Community would
have been adequately manifested.1
THE TREATY AND SUPRANATIONALISM
There has been significant controversy over whether Euratom
is a supranational entity capable of effectively enforcing its au-
thority within the territory of Member States.2 For example, it is
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1. Hahn, Control Under the Euratom Compact, 7 Am. J. COMP. L. 23, 46
(1958). See also S. GOODSPEED, THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION 5-9 (1967).
2. "Euratom, as is the case with a multitude of other international or-
ganizations, is not a supranational entity with power to enforce its authority,
if necessary, by physical force under its own control." Gorove, The First
Multinational Atomic Inspection and Control System at Work: Euratom's Ex-
perience, 18 STAN. L. REV. 160, 180 (1965). See also J. POLACH, EURATOM 7
(1964).
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argued with reference to safety control provisions that Article
83(3) of the Euratom Treaty3 is unsatisfactory in that it only
provides for recommendations to be made to Member States rather
than positive enforcement measures. However, Article 83(2) pro-
vides that when penalties are imposed under Chapter VII that the
decisions of the Commission shall be enforceable and that they
may be enforced in the territories of Member States in accordance
with Article 164. Under Article 164, forced execution is gov-
erned by the rules of civil procedure of the State in which it takes
place. The procedure followed is that the domestic authority
designated by the Member State serves the writ of execution, and
the forced execution is conducted under municipal law. The su-
pervision as to the regularity of the measures of execution is within
the competence of the domestic courts. Only the Court of Jus-
tice of the Community may suspend the forced execution.
One means by which to judge the extent to which Euratom
approximates a supranational institution is to examine its authority
to conduct its own foreign affairs, its authority to enter into ex-
ternal agreements. Article 1 of the Euratom Treaty states that it
is the aim of the Community to develop ". . . commercial ex-
changes with other countries by the creation of conditions neces-
sary for the speedy establishment and growth of nuclear indus-
tries."4  Article 2(h) makes reference to this same idea in slightly
different language:
For the attainment of its aims the Community shall, in ac-
cordance with the provisions set out in this Treaty...
(h) establish with other countries and with international or-
ganisations any contacts likely to promote progress in the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy.5
The question is, to what extent "commercial exchanges" and "con-
3. Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Published
by the Secretariat of the Interim Committee for the Common Market and Eura-
tom, Rome, 1957, (1931/5/57/4), 298 U.N.T.S. 167 (1958) [hereinafter cited
as Euratom Treaty]. Article 83(3) provides "The Commission may make any
recommendations to Member States concerning Legislative provisions designed
to ensure the observance in their territories of the obligations resulting from the
provisions of this Chapter."
Article 161 provides that "Recommendations and opinions shall have no
binding force."
4. Euratom Treaty, Art. 1, para. 2. See also A.H. ROBERTSON, EUROPEAN
INSTITUTIONS 185-92 (1966); D.W. BowETT, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL IN-
STITUTIONS 169-82 (1963); E.H. WALL, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE Euio-
PEAN COMMuNTIES 35-47 (1966).
5. Id. at Art. 2(h).
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tacts" can be considered in terms of an external relations function?
Chapter X deals specifically with external relations, and Ar-
ticle 101 permits the Community to enter into obligations "by
means of the conclusion of agreements or conventions with a third
country, an international organisation or a national of a third
country."6  This article (101) is said by Professor Hahn 7 to in-
clude both public and private international law arrangements due
largely to the influence of Judge Philip Jessup's work on Transna-
tional Law." Majoi agreements of this type have been concluded
with the United States9 as well as with the United Kingdom and
Canada. There have also been agreements of a less important
nature concluded with Argentina and Brazil. Regarding the latter
two agreements, it has been suggested that they reflect Euratom's
desire to corner potential reactor markets in addition to the sym-
bolic value of aiding developing nations. 10 Article 101 further
provides that the Council issue directives outlining the negotiation
procedures, and that it also approves the agreement by a qualified
majority vote. The exception to this is that the Commission can
act independently if the action is within the appropriate budget and
if it informs the Council of its action.
There is the possibility of conflict between Article 101 and
the second paragraph of Article 115 which provides that the Coun-
cil ". . . shall take all measures within its competence in order to
co-ordinate the actions of Member States and of the Commun-
ity."" While several of the other Articles of Section II dealing
with the Council are repealed by the agreement consolidating the
Council and the Commission of the European Communities,12
6. Id. at Art. 101, para. 1.
7. Hahn, Euratom: The Conception of an International Personality, 71
HARv. L. REv. 1001, 1012 (1958).
8. P. JEssuP, TRANSNATIONAL LAw 2 (1956). Transnational Law is that
which comprises all norms applicable to affairs transcending the jurisdictional
and territorial limits of a State or an international organization.
9. Agreement for cooperation between the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity and the Government of the United States of America; European
Atomic Energy Community, 8 Nov. 1958, Publication Dept. of the European
Communities, 2115/5/59/6.
10. Scheinman, Euraton: Nuclear Integration in Europe, Int'l Conc. 18
(May, 1967: No. 563).
11. Euratom Treaty, Art. 115, para. 2.
12. Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the
European Communities, Publications Department of the European Communities
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Article 115 remains and is given renewed authority by Article I of
the consolidation treaty. 13  Depending on the interpretation one
gives to the phrase, "within its competence" found in Article 115,
an argument could be put forward to the effect that the Council
was given powers by Article 115 that are greater than those found
in Article 101 and that the Council may consider activities ex-
traneous to its limited role as depicted in Article 101. A more
limited interpretation would resolve this possible conflict by stating
that Article 101 is the reference point of the phrase "within its
competence" and, therefore, the Council is limited in its activities
by this provision.
Article 102 of the Euratom Treaty provides that when an
agreement is concluded with a third country, an international or-
ganization or a third State national, and where one or more Mem-
ber States are parties in addition to the Community, that the Mem-
ber States shall notify the Commission that the agreement has be-
come applicable in accordance with their municipal law. Article
103 places an obligation on a State entering into such an agree-
ment to notify the Commission to the extent that it concerns the
field of application of the Treaty. The State is forbidden from con-
cluding the proposed agreement until it has satisfied the Commis-
sion of its compatibility either by its own argument or by petition
to the Court of Justice. However, Article 106 provides that when
the agreement antedates the Euratom Treaty, the Member State,
jointly with the Commission, is encouraged to enter into negotia-
tions the end of which will be to have the Community assume the
obligations of the prior agreement. The resultant new agreement
must receive the approval of the Member State signatory to the
prior agreement as well as the Council acting by means of a quali-
fied majority vote. It would appear to be inconsistent to demand
Commission approval for new agreements while requiring only
Council approval for new agreements that have a basis in some
prior arrangement. Thus, there remains some ambiguity as to
whether Member States retain the capacity to undertake third
party agreements.' 4
13. Art. I of the Treaty provides in part that "The Council shall exercise
the powers and the competences devolving upon these institutions under the con-
ditions laid down in the Treaties establishing . . . the European Atomic Energy
Community."
14. Scheinman, supra note 10 at 19.
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SANCTIONS
The sanctions available under the Euratom Treaty refer pri-
marily to the inspection and control of nuclear installations. The
basis for the sanctioning process is the cooperation of the Member
States since the Community has no independent sanctioning force
of its own. Concerning safety control, inspectors are recruited by
the Commission who have the responsibility of obtaining and veri-
fying the accounting required by Article 79 and reporting any in-
fringement to the Commission. The Commission, in turn, issues
a directive requiring the Member State to take all necessary mea-
sures ". . . to terminate any infringement so found and . . . [to]
inform the Council thereof."'15 If there is no compliance, the
Commission or any interested Member State may refer the matter
to the Court of Justice. A broader provision found in Article 142
states that "any Member State which considers that another Mem-
ber State has failed to fulfill any of its obligations under this
Treaty may refer the matter to the Court of Justice."' 6 The power
of review of the Court of Justice is found in Article 146 and is
limited to review of acts other than recommendations or opinions
of the Council or Commission.
For this purpose, it shall be competent to give judgment on
appeals by a Member State, the Council or the Commission
on grounds of incompetence, of errors of substantial form, of
infringement of this Treaty or of any legal provision relating
to its application, or of abuse of powers.'
Following the judicial procedure, the ultimate sanctioning power
lies with the State under Article 143 which provides that when the
Court of Justice finds that a Member State has not fulfilled any of
its obligations under the Treaty that ". . . such State shall take the
measures required for the implementation of the judgment of the
Court.""'
The other general provision dealing with sanctions is Article
83(1) which allows the Commission to impose penalties following
any infringement of the provisions of Chapter VII on safety con-
trol. The penalties are graded and range from a warning to the
complete withdrawal of source materials or special fissionable ma-
15. Euratom Treaty, Art. 82, para. 3.
16. Id. at Art. 142, para. 1.
17. Id. at Art. 146, para. 1.
18. Id. at Art. 143.
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terials. 19 Section 4 of Article 83 again provides that it is the
Member State that is responsible for the enforcement of penalties
and also for the making of reparation by those responsible for any
infringement. Where the decision of the Commission concerns the
withdrawal of materials, it may be enforced in accordance with
Article 83(2) under municipal law in the territories of the Mem-
ber States once they are verified by the competent national au-
thority" There is also a broader provision in Article 83(2)
which states: "The protection of injured interests shall be guaran-
teed by an appropriate legal procedure." 1  While the Commis-
sion may request the Court of Justice to immediately enforce their
decision, it is possible to bring an appeal which has a staying ef-
fect.22
In the special case of the inspection of nuclear facilities, if
there is any opposition to the carrying out of an inspection, "...
the Commission shall apply to the President of the Court of Jus-
tice for a warrant to enforce the carrying out of the inspection.
The President of the Court of Justice shall give a decision within
a period of three days."'2 3  Once again, however, it is the State that
must ultimately ensure access by the inspectors to the places named
in the warrant or decision.2
4
19. The penalties are as follows:
(a) a warning;
(b) the withdrawal of special advantages, such as financial or technical
assistance;
(c) the placing of the enterprise, for a maximum period of four
months, under the administration of a person or board appointed
jointly by the Commission and the State having jurisdiction over
such enterprise; or
(d) the complete or partial withdrawal of source materials or special
fissionable materials. Euratom Treaty, Art. 83(1).
20. Id. at Art. 83(2). See also Art. 164.
21. Id. at Art. 83(2), para. 3.
22. The grant of jurisdiction for the Court is found in Art. 144(b). For a
general discussion, see BEBR, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
(1962).
23. Euratom Treaty, Art. 81, para. 3. If there may be a delay, the Com-
mission may issue a decision to the effect that the decision is to be carried out.
Art. 81, para. 4.
24. Id. at Art. 81, para. 5. "Viewed against these considerations, the Com-
munity's control system is not without significance, particularly since it embodies
an experiment in direct administration and, though not unique to Euratom,
permits international inspectors with broad rights of access to persons, places,
and data to enter the territory of a sovereign State. This coupled with judicial
safeguards, is, despite the system's limitations, a most significant step forward in
the development of world institutions." Gorove, The First Multinational
Atomic Inspection and Control System at Work: Euratom's Experience, 18
STAN. L. REv. 160, 186 (1965).
Vol. I
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INTERPRETATION
Liberal interpretative analysis can indicate a supranational
interest in several additional clauses that deal with external affairs.
Article 192, paragraph 1, provides that Member States shall take
appropriate action to carry out the obligations arising out of the
Treaty or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Com-
munity. In addition, the Member States undertake to facilitate
the achievement of the aims of the Community while at the same
time abstaining from any measures likely to jeopardize the achieve-
ment of these aims. It might be desirable to interpret "appropriate
action" in such a way that external relations of a supranational
character are sanctioned. Similarly, Article 199 provides that the
Commission is responsible for ensuring "all suitable contacts"
with the United Nations, and the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade. "The Commission shall also ensure appropriate con-
tacts with all international organisations. ' 25 These suitable and ap-
propriate contacts may involve activities of various kinds, some of
which could certainly be of a supranational nature.
A major part of any attempt at interpretation of the Treaty
would require adherence to a view that the scope of law-making
powers of Euratom included implied powers. Article 161 pro-
vides that
[f]or the achievement of their aims and under the conditions
provided for in this Treaty, the Council and the Commission
shall adopt regulations and directives, make decisions and
formulate recommendations or opinions.2 6
Of these, "regulations" have general application and are binding
and directly applicable in each Member State. "Directives" bind
any Member State to which they are addressed pertaining to the
result to be attained, but domestic agencies have the competence to
derive the means and form. "Decisions" are binding only to the
addressees named therein. Recommendations and opinions have
no binding force. As to each of these categories, the question can
be raised of whether or not there must be a specific request under
a provision of the Treaty for a regulation, directive, or decision to
be made. While it is possible to construe the Treaty in such a way
as to allow the development of an implied power based on the
desirability of carrying out the objectives of the Community, it can
25. Id. at Art. 199, para. 2.
26. Id. at Art. 161, para. 1.
1970
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also be argued that there is specific statutory authority within the
Treaty which concludes that there must be distinct authorization.
Specifically, Article 103 states that
[i]f any action by the Community appears necessary to
achieve one of the aims of the Community in cases where this
Treaty has not provided for the requisite powers of action,
the Council, acting by means of a unanimous vote on a pro-
posal of the Commission and after the Assembly has been
consulted, shall enact the appropriate provisions.27
If it is argued that this Article provides for an exclusive means of
action, then it would follow that in every instance where the Treaty
was not expressly applicable, there would need to be a unanimous
vote by the Council on a proposal of the Commission, coupled
with consultation with the Assembly. On the other hand, it may
be that this Article simply provides an alternative means of action
since in some cases it may prove desirable to take formal action
in order to embark on a new and untried activity where reinforce-
ment for the action could be obtained from the procedure outlined
above, but on other occasions it might prove desirable to enable
the Commission to issue directives, regulations, or decisions based
on an implied power of action. There would probably be a stan-
dard of good faith applied to any such actions, but this might prove
more satisfactory than to demand a unanimous vote of the Council
for every new activity.
Stein and Hay relate an example of the above controversy re-
lating to the Euratom Commission's responsibility for publishing
production programs indicating targets for nuclear energy activities
and the types of necessary investments, coupled with industry in-
volvement in communicating investment projects to the Commis-
sion before they are undertaken. It is the role of the Commission
to discuss all aspects of any such project with the person or enter-
prise involved and communicate its views to the Member State
concerned. The Commission then makes a proposal to the Coun-
cil which in turn establishes the criteria as to the type and scope of
the projects communicated to the Commission under Article 41.
In this example, subsequent to the Council regulation, the Com-
mission enacted a regulation establishing a detailed questionnaire
to be sent to the enterprises. The argument was then made that
there was no direct Treaty authorization for this action, and that
even if there was an implied power it could not be used to expand
27, Id. at Art. 203. See also EEC Treaty, Art. 235,
Vol. 1
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the scope of inquiry beyond that established by the Council. The
counter-argument given was that the Commission needed the
power to authoritatively require information if it was to operate
effectively. A working group of the Euratom Council and Com-
mission issued an unsatisfactory interpretative statement which did
not specify the amount of information that the Commission could
demand. The conclusion of the authors was that it was probably
wise not to raise this question in the Community Court given the
early stage of Community development .
28
It would appear to make more sense to enable the Commis-
sion to act within a limited sphere of competence without requiring
formal voting action in each specific instance. It is a standard of
statutory interpretation that the provisions of a treaty are to be in-
terpreted in such a way as to supply provisions without which it
would be impossible to implement the main provisions of the
Treaty. 9 The assumption would then be that Euratom could
demonstrate any activities that are necessary to the exercise of a
foreign relations power unless it was expressly reserved to the
Member States. This would appear to allow both unilateral acts
if in the Community interest and informal negotiations.30
28. Law and Institutions in the Atlantic Area 875 (E. Stein and P. Hay
eds. 1967), reprinted from Stein, The New Institutions, in STEIN AND NICHOLSON,
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET: A LEGAL PROFILE
33, 73-75 (1960). They further report that in a subsequent regulation, the Com-
mission asked for specific information concerning control against the diversion of
nuclear materials on the theory of implied powers.
29. "Under international law, the Organization [U.N.] must be deemed to
have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are
conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance
of its duties." Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United
Nations, International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, 1949 (C.J. Rep. 174).
See also McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat (17 U.S.) 316, 421 (1819); United
States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1960); Kinsella v. United States ex rel Singleton,
361 U.S. 234 (1960). See generally, Dodd, Implied Powers and Implied Limi-
tation in Constitutional Law, 29 YALE L.J. 137, 141-42 (1919-1920).
30. Parry, The Treaty-Making Power of the U.N., 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
108, 115 (1949). Seyersted suggests that once an organization has come into
being through the agreement of its Member State that it has an inherent com-
petence to perform acts designed to carry out its purposes providing that it is
practical for it to do so. It does not matter whether there is a grant of power
either explicitly or implicitly made in its constituent instrument. If the limita-
tions in the organization are too great then all that has been created is a joint
agency. The opposing view is that the extent of the organization's powers is a
question of treaty interpretation whereby competence is defined solely by the
express provisions of the treaty or implied therefrom. A middle ground would
be to stress the importance of the statement of purpose of the Treaty and con-
1970
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II
CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES
One difficulty with the concept of supranationalism is that it
presupposes a recognized interest among a political grouping of
States that is different, distinguishable, or somehow separable from
the interests of any one of them. The practical questions become,
first, the determination of the most efficient unit in relation to the
subject matter involved for the decision-making process, and sec-
ond, the level of government at which people are willing to allow
these decisions to be made. Euratom exhibits certain debts to
federalism such as the fact that it is based on a written document
and is subject to a court of law. However, it is also true that the
theory, that an independent entity can be set up that will not
reflect national prejudices because the men involved with it be-
come servants of the group rather than representatives of their re-
spective countries, is at variance with historical reality."'
The original idea for Euratom embodied the ideal that a
supranational venture involving nuclear power might be easily
achieved without significant controversy, 2 but the general im-
pression at the present time is that the degree of unification re-
quired has not been met and that, in fact,
[i]f we return to present times, we are forced to conclude
clude that within these agreed purposes that the organization may do anything that
falls within the general purview of this statement even though there may not be
express authorization within the specific treaty provisions. See LEGAL ADVISORS
AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 14-17 (H.C.L. Merillat ed. 1966); Seyersted,
International Personality of Intergovernmental Organizations, 4 INDIAN J. INT'L
L. 1 (1964); and Seyersted, Is the International Personality of Intergovernmental
Organizations Valid vis-a-vis Non-Members, Id. at 233.
31. See Beloff, International Integration and the Modern State, 112 in THE
COMMON MARKET: PROGRESS AND CONTROVERSY (L.B. Krause ed. 1964); Re-
garding international-oriented personnel, Jenks has said: "Experience has shown
that the degree of international loyalty shown by the staff of an international
organization is likely to be an important factor in the success or failure of the
organization." Jenks, Some Constitutional Problems of International Organiza-
tions, 22 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 11, 44 (1945); Reuter suggests that the test for
determining whether a person is a State agent or an international agent is by
ascertaining the accountability of the person and compounding this with an
analysis of the person's independence and responsibility. P. REUTER, INTERNA-
TIONAL INSTITUTIONS 241-48 (1958).
32. "Instrumental in the choice of nuclear power as the subject of a new
joint venture was also the consideration that harnessing the atom on a suprana-
tional basis might be less controversial and less clouded by powerful national
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that such integration as was achieved in the fifties is now
under direct menace from the general revival of national self-
confidence, and that we may, for the future, be reduced to the
type of intensive co-operation seen in both the EEC and
EFTA today.88
A further bar to the supranational nature of Euratom was the
necessity for the development of the nuclear inspection and control
system. It attempted to invade the sovereignty of Member States
and implicitly raised the spectre of non-compliance and bad faith,
thereby increasing national suspicions. Some of the smaller Eu-
ropean countries feared Euratom domination in this area and were
in favor of the development of the European Nuclear Energy
Agency (ENEA) which had no legal personality of its own and
had its activities integrated into the economic policies of the Or-
ganization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)-now
known as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD).8 4
There was also hesitancy regarding the formation of Euratom
as a supranational institution on the part of American business en-
tities. It was generally believed that the development of Euratom
would adversely affect private technological exchange agreements
and private contracts for nuclear development. Euratom was
seen as a "middle-man" that would dilute the profitable ventures
which were possible if only national corporations were the primary
participants. The preference for industry-to-industry agreements
was supported by the argument that private industry was in a bet-
ter position to furnish the needed materials, and would in fact give
better guarantees than the government agencies would. The result
of this pressure was that ". . . through a series of unrelated events,
Euratom lost the needed momentum for her supranational bid to
become a viable power promoting agency." 5 On the other hand,
33. The European Free Trade Association and the Crisis of European Inte-
gration, by a Study Group, Graduate Institute of International Studies, 39, Geneva
(1968). It is further argued that integration involving the sharing of sover-
eignty is so revolutionary as to require exceptionally strong forces working in
its favor such as the fear of war or economic disaster, and that these are not
present in Europe today. Id. at 37.
34. Gorove, The Inspection and Control System of the European Nuclear
Energy Agency, 7 VA. J. INT'L L. 72 (1967). Nations such as Switzerland and
Sweden preferred their own ENEA inspectors to Euratom officials and definitely
did not want IAEA inspection involving Communist officials.
35. Goodman, American's Role in the Creation of Euratom, 8 ATOMIC
ENERGY L.J. 128 (1966). General Electric's SENN guarantees for the construc-
1970
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there was general United States government approval for Eura-
tom since it would free European fuel dependency which had
rested on the Middle East, which could cause serious political diffi-
culties if international policial conflicts arose.
CONTINUAL CRISIS
While the nationalism exhibited by the United States arose
primarily from the pressure of private business enterprises, there
was also a general concept of nationalism with which the Member
States of Euratom had to contend. The problem of nationalism
has resulted in a continual state of crisis in Euratom which is
caused, to no small extent, by the concept of supranationalism
which, in practice, has met with disapproval from the major Mem-
ber States, particularly France and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. While the early years of Euratom reflected attempts to or-
ganize and begin operations, it was not long until it became appar-
ent that a lack of surveillance over national nuclear activities had
resulted in a competitive market being established that would work
to the detriment of Euratom.
Particularly, France, the most advanced nuclear power in
Euratom, decided to continue and expand its national nuclear
program at the expense of the cooperative effort. By limiting the
number of scientists and technological personnel made available
to Euratom and by refusing to bring the French nuclear facility
at Grenoble into the Euratom program, France was able to retard
Euratom development and raise problems concerning the good
faith intentions with which the Euratom program was begun.
This conflict was heightened by the refusal of France to allow Eu-
ratom control and inspection over a large number of its nuclear
facilities that were said to be engaged in defense activities. The
conflict in 1960-61 regarding the extent of defense purposes
was a serious occurrence and damaged Community spirit pertain-
ing to whether the activities of Euratom were to be truly suprana-
tional or were to merely reflect the wishes of the most advanced
Member State to the detriment of the Community.
An example of the unilateral activities of France occurred
when, as a result of all the available French plutonium going into
the French independent nuclear deterrent, the force de frappe,
tion of a 150 megawatt boiling water reactor at Punta Fiume, Italy, exceeded
those offered by the United States to Euratom.
Vol. I
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France attempted to enter bilateral negotiations with the United
States and Great Britain to obtain an additional supply for their
fast breeder reactor. Having failed in these negotiations, France
had to turn to Euratom for the necessary fissile material and an as-
sociation agreement. As Scheinman states, "While it is the EEC
that has been the object of the most frontal political attack that
Paris has yet mounted against supranational integration, it is Eu-
ratom that has suffered the more severe consequences."3 6 This
use of Article 84 (which limits control to non-defense materials)
by France to forbid Euratom inspection of their Marcoule plant
further damaged Euratom/Member-State relations. Euratom had
contended that nuclear activities constituted a single track system
and that Euratom could not divide these activities into a two chan-
nel system-a peaceful and a defensive line. Thus, temporary
harmony was achieved by allowing France and other Community
countries to use atomic energy for military purposes subject only to
Euratom's open-book policy which allowed any use so long as it
conformed to the user's announced intention, subject to the Arti-
cle 84 restriction.17
The departure of General de Gaulle from active government
participation may somewhat change the degree of French par-
ticipation with the Community, but it is much too early to make
any definitive predictions. It should be remembered, however,
that the same motives that were available to de Gaulle in for-
mulating his Euratom policy will also be available to the new po-
litical leader of France who may feel that a strong show of nation-
alism is his best political move at the early stages of his term of
office.
However, there are some circumstances in which the supra-
national character of Euratom has been clearly indicated. Follow-
ing the failure of the Community to get France to include its re-
actor in their program, action was taken to shift funds from the
Euratom five-year research program to a project for the construc-
36. Scheinman, supra note 10 at 39.
37. See Gorove, Lessons from the Control of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic
Energy in Euratom, 1964 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. Vol. 58, 136, 142.
Germany could follow the same course of action as France, but any activity would
become known under the open-book policy and Germany is prohibited by other
treaty obligations from developing nuclear weapons. While generally Euratom
controls only the peaceful uses of atomic energy, this control and inspection
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tion of a power reactor. The result of a qualified majority vote
was that the Council allocated up to $32 million for reactor con-
struction. To the extent that this action was taken over the direct
protest of France, it could be said that this was a decision indicat-
ing the supranational character of the organization.
The prolonged crisis over the second five-year program
(1963-67), wherein the Member States voiced their individual
and many times noncompatible preferences, indicated a shift
away from supranationalism. The form of the debate, which
continued for more than a year, was an inter-governmental dis-
pute rather than a meeting where there was any common feeling
outside and possibly contrary to the respective governmental posi-
tions. Again it was French nationalism that caused the majority
of the difficulty, particularly their position favoring concentration
which would focus Euratom expenditures on "major targets of
mutual interest.""8  Since it was unlikely that any further monies
would be put into Euratom, it was obvious that any concentration
would come about through the elimination of projects already un-
derway, to the displeasure of those countries in which the projects
were being carried out.
There were further problems that centered around the allo-
cation of the available funds. It was charged that funds were
distributed in response to political pressure and also in direct rela-
tion to the financial contribution of the Member State to the Com-
munity. 9 Due to a disagreement on procedure, there was diffi-
culty in formulating the 1965 budget and a provisional budget
was passed along with a supplementary budget by a qualified ma-
jority vote over the dissent of Italy. This once again indicated the
implications of supranational power. While program revision was
achieved in May of 1965, the continuing crisis of June 1965
through February 1966 added to the state of uncertainty.
38. The projects considered by this phrase included the ORGEL project
concerning a medium-term natural uranium reactor, fast reactors, and controlled
thermonuclear fusion projects. See Euratom's Second Five-Year Research
Program, 1963-67, European Community Information Service, Comm. Topics
23 (1966).
39. Scheinman supra note 10 at 45. The Italian argument was that Eura-
tom should concentrate on nuclear development based on scientific and eco-
nomic criteria rather than political concerns through emphases on the then ex-
isting enriched uranium reactors. In short, Italy wanted short term profitabil-
ity, France wanted nuclear independence, and West Germany was in between
the two. Id. at 46, 47.
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Current problems are centered around the fast reactor asso-
ciation contract program, and the fact that Euratom cannot main-
tain its share (35%) of the association with the two major part-
ners, West Germany and France. The problem has been charac-
terized as follows:
The association contract system, which accounts for approxi-
mately 40 percent of the total Euratom budget, has not led
to a full sharing of know-how and knowledge, has not elimi-
nated duplication and waste (the Federal Republic and
France conduct rival programs geared to the construction of
similar prototype reactors), and has not truly served to co-
ordinate national programs in the framework of Community
development.40
There is a real question as to the degree of disparity that can exist
in the Coummunity while still maintaining an effective degree of
supranational authority. As long as a gap exists in the techno-
logical development scale of the participating countries, it is prob-
able that true supranational integration will not be achieved.
As a result of the above-mentioned inability of Euratom to
continue in the fast reactor program, a decision was taken to re-
duce appropriations for eleven projects in favor of four others.
These and other reallocation decisions had entailed more than two
years of discussions and had resulted in the retardation of other
necessary programs such as biology and the development of proven
reactor technology involving prestressed concrete, thermal insula-
tion of concrete, and twisted tapes. Personnel was reduced by
22%, even though this meant that it would not be possible to get
the full benefit from the facilities of the Joint Research Centre or
successfully implement the major associations' programs.
In February 1967, the Commission submitted to the Council
of Ministers a document designed to bring about discussions of a
third program which was to start on January 1, 1968. This docu-
ment, entitled Euratom's Future Activities, failed, and the Com-
mission of the European Communities was not able to prepare a
preliminary draft research and investment budget for 1968, nor
was it possible for the Commission to study the modifications nec-
essary for drafting a future program to take account of trends in
nuclear science and developments in national programs. The
Commission did submit an interim program for one year in No-
vember 1967 following consultation with the Scientific and Tech-
40. Id. at 50.
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nical Committee and the Consultative Committee on Nuclear Re-
search. On December 8, 1967, the Council concurred and drew
up the interim budget and a draft research budget for 1968. A
distinction was made between direct action by Euratom, such as
activities carried out by the Joint Research Centre, and indirect ac-
tion, such as programs conducted through association contracts or
research contracts. The significance of this was that while reduc-
ing the allocations for direct action somewhat, the Council was
able to reject the Commission's proposals that association ar-
rangements should be financed by the Community during 1968
so as not to lose them for future programs. However, provision
was made for transitional arrangements allowing for the continued
payment by the Community of Commission staff members par-
ticipating in these programs.
The Council also discussed Euratom's future activities on the
basis of a document submitted which suggested the following
guidelines:
(i) formulation of a concerted prototype policy supple-
mented by large-scale joint supporting programmes.
This problem exists in the case of both fast reactors
and heavy-water and high-temperature converters.
(ii) action to ensure the dependability of supply of nuclear
fuels, particularly enriched uranium, for Community
users, possibly by setting up a European isotope separa-
tion plant.41
It remains in each program to decide on the type of cooperation
to be implemented and the extent to which the public interest will
be affected. Public interest may be defined in terms of projects for
nuclear measurements, health and safety, radiation hygiene, train-
ing, and the dissemination of information. Possible joint action
activities included work on future reactors, proven-type reactors,
and general research on biology and controlled thermonuclear
41. First General Report on the Activities of the Communities, 299, 1967.
European Coal and Steel Community, European Economic Community, Euro-
pean Atomic Energy Community, Commission, Brussels-Luxembourg, Feb. 1968.
Research programs are drawn up under Article 7 of the Euratom Treaty while
Article 6 and Chapter V dealing with Joint Enterprises offers additional possi-
bilities for action.
"In this context, the Commission emphasizes that the merging of the Insti-
tutions as a prelude to the amalgamation of the three Treaties affords the oppor-
tunity for joint action to go beyond the field of atomic energy and, by incor-
porating all pioneering techniques, to make the fullest use of the infrastructures
created with the advent of nuclear energy." Id. at 300.
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fusion. In sum, the Commission would prefer to avoid dispersion
of effort and find a workable link with private industrial develop-
ment.
The Council, while not reaching a decision on the Commis-
sion's document at the discussion on December 8, 1967, did adopt
a resolution containing a number of proposals for future Euratom
projects with emphasis on a joint program having a comprehensive
scope which would be financed by the Member States on the basis
of a budget containing a fixed scale of contributions.4 2  There
would also be supplementary programs which would be the re-
sponsibility only of those Member States which made individual
agreements with the Commission if it did not prove possible to
obtain unanimity. The form for cooperation under these pro-
grams is to be examined jointly by the Commission and the Coun-
cil to determine budgetary matters and the extent of information to
be given to non-participating countries. The Council also dis-
tinguished between activities which presented no industrial prob-
lems and those which presupposed a joint industrial policy. There
was agreement that non-member countries in Europe should be in-
vited to participate in the latter categories of programs. Finally,
the resolution instructed a special study group of the Consultative
Committee on Nuclear Research to consider the question of the
long-term supply of enriched uranium so that the appropriate
proposals could be submitted to the Council.
INTERPRETATION
While the difficulties of Euratom appear amenable to long-
run solution based on a reallocation of research and development
monies and the adoption of a more structured supranational form
of organization, the major drawback may turn out to be the lack
of the basic desire for cooperation regarding nuclear policy:
42. The joint programs contemplated would consist of the following:
(i) the activities of the Joint Nuclear Research Centre, whose present
programmes are being revised in the light of the need to use ex-
isting plant and available personnel to best advantage. Wherever
legally possible, research may also encompass non-nuclear activities;
(ii) certain present and possible future activities under association
agreements, to the extent that they are of Community interest or
could be the subject of scientific cooperation between the various
national programmes and do not constitute wasteful overlapping.
Special importance will be attached to Community research work
and basic programmes concerning reactor development;
(iii) training of scientists and documentation. Id.
For a discussion of the JNRC see The Euratom Joint Nuclear Research Centre,
European Community Information Service, Community Topics, 16.
1970
17
Smith: European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom): The Limits of Suprana
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1970
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
But the real cause of the crisis is the absence of any genuine
political will for joint action. It is deeply disquieting that
once again agreement has proved possible only on a provi-
sional programme for one year-and even then half the pro-
jects are to be paid for by only five of the Member States out
of six-while the 1969 research budget is still not adopted.
If the Member States should get into the habit of financing
only those projects which are of direct concern to them, the re-
sult would be a rapid and serious deterioration of Community
action. 43
This separation of political and economic decision-making has led
to a situation where the sixteen power plants in Europe were (or
will be) constructed by twelve firms while the 87 power plants in
the United States were constructed by five firms. In addition, the
total value of the orders placed with the firms in the Community
is ". . . less than that of the orders placed with each of the
American firms. ' 44  The resultant fragmentation must be reme-
died if any form of supranational organization is to survive. Eu-
ratom cannot simply be a seventh power adding its programs to
those of the Member States on a secondary basis. The develop-
ment of a single integrated European nuclear policy will require
that all Member States be willing to support activities that do not
always have an immediate return so that basic research can be
supported at an adequate level.
To achieve a successful supranational organization, it will
also be necessary to end the isolation of European universities,
government research centers and individual firms. This would
involve the elimination of administrative and fiscal obstacles to
international mergers and a more enlightened patent policy.45
43. Introduction to the Second General Report on the Activities of the
Communities in 1968, Commission of the European Communities, 6, Spokes-
man's Group, Brussels, Feb. 1969. It was further stated that there was a feeling
of bitterness and impatience that followed the discussions of Member States in
reducing their joint efforts in the first large technological centre created by the
Community while at the same time ". . . American cosmonauts were flying
round the moon and striving to outbid their Soviet rivals in the conquest of
space!" Id.
44. Survey of the Nuclear Polity of the European Communities, Secretariat
General of the Commission, ECSC-EEC-EAEC, Published by the European Com-
munities 4001/5/1968/5.
45. "In the final analysis, the basic problem with Euratom is the subject
matter over which it governs. Developing a universal patent valid within the
Common Market and returning atomic energy wholly within the patent system
will be only partial steps in curing the problems. There is still the dual purpose
of atomic energy, one peaceful, the other destructive. As long as nuclear in-
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Without an integration of effort it is likely that Euratom nations
will not be able to effectively compete with outside technology and
suppliers of nuclear materials. This, in turn, will lead to more
nationalistic activity which will further erode the concept of Eura-
tom as a supranational entity. Further, if Euratom fails, prece-
dent would be created for the further withdrawal of funds from
other areas of European cooperation. One current impression of
the situation is
FOR LACK OF A clearly stated POLITICAL DETERMI-
NATION to take the imperative corrective measures, the cre-
ation of a genuine common market will be irremediably jeop-
ardized and the present walling-off of each country's market
will become yet more pronounced, thus helping non-Com-
munity techniques to consolidate a supremacy that will soon
be impregnable. 46
One suggestion for future action is the establishment of transna-
tional groupings of nuclear industrial firms which would set up a
small number of competitive consortia to bargain for a large
volume of European business. This restructuring of nuclear in-
dustry on a multinational basis would provide for a competitive
market which would help achieve the goals of the Community.
To this end, the Commission proposed that guarantees be given
to the consortia against unexpected problems encountered in the
use of nuclear power, that Community or national aid be given
to the consortia to develop advanced designs, that assistance be
given on a Community or national level to promote the restructur-
ing of the reactor component industry on a Community basis, and
that an attempt be made at standardization to prevent future indus-
try problems. Further suggestions included the advocacy of a defi-
nition of a joint policy as regards the choice of reactor types, 47 the
formation is classified and held secret by the nations of the world, actual
progress necessarily will be slow and restricted." Patent Policies of the European
Atomic Energy Community, 30 U. PrTr. L. REV. 331, 363 (1968). On patent
questions, see also Meller, Toward a Multinational Patent System, 44 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'Y 227 (1962); Beckhoefer and Stein, Patent Aspects of Domestic Law,
Euratom, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, 55 MICH. L. REV. 747,
770 (1958); Von Holstein, International Co-operation in the Field of Patent Law
with Special Reference to the Activities of the Council of Europe, 16 INT'L AND
COMP. L.Q. 191 (1967); W. WHITE and B. RAVENSCROFT, PATENTS THROUGHOUT
THE WORLD (1966).
46. Research and Technology, 1, The Commission of the European Com-
munities defines "Euratom's Future Activities," Bulletin published by the Com-
mission of the European Communities, No. 15, Brussels, April 30, 1969.
47. By granting selective aids such as joint enterprise status, guarantees
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adoption of a joint policy on fissile materials (particularly on en-
riched uranium), more effective coordination of the nuclear re-
search programs carried out in the Community, and the gradual
reorientation of the research potential of the Joint Centre towards
non-nuclear fields.
While the above ideas appear feasible, they run contrary to
the "in fact" disparities in the capabilities and goals of the par-
ticipating governments. France has little use for Euratom, favor-
ing instead a national approach coupled with minimal invest-
ment in Euratom projects. The Benelux Countries and Italy give
much more credence to Euratom to the extent that its activities
conform to their own national goals. In short, Euratom enables
these countries to actively participate in nuclear industry. Italy
favors the development of cheap energy sources and any means
by which parity with France and West Germany can be obtained.
The fact that private industry controls the majority of West Ger-
man nuclear activity means that an attempt at supranational con-
trol through Euratom will be less than completely successful.
Further, West Germany's coal resources are substantial and, thus,
nuclear power does not have the urgency that it has for various
other nations. The conflict in France is over whether the Com-
missariat a l'Energie Atomique will be able to subsume Euratom
to the domestic interests of the French program which empha-
sizes independence as a concept. "But as in the latter fields (for-
eign and defense policy), so too in the nuclear field, France does
not intend to purchase independence for Europe at the price of
an increased supranational system in Europe."48  The difficulty
is that by hindering Euratom, France has only served to increase
nuclear business originating in the United States and Great Britain




There are a number of alternatives to be considered for a
supranational type structure for Euratom which would concentrate
against selected risks, etc., the Community could promote the concentration of
resources on a common technique for fast breeders, high temperature reactors
and heavy-water reactors. It should be noted that the Commission has proposed
an abandonment of the ORGEL heavy-water reactor. Id. at 3.
48. Scheinman, supra note 10 at 35.
49. Id. at 31-35.
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on the subject matter of the organization. The primary function
of the EEC is to control and regulate while the primary function
of Euratom is to integrate and promote the production and use of
nuclear energy and to raise the standard of living in the Member
States. It is possible, if the objectives of Euratom are to be main-
tained, that it will become necessary to provide for a more compre-
hensive integration of nuclear energy policies into the broader
context of a European policy on science and technology. While
this would allow Euratom policy to be more closely tied to general
economic and industrial policy, it might also result in a de-empha-
sis on nuclear energy at a time when a scientific breakthrough
might create a situation of extreme importance for a body with
Euratom's potential.
Given the joint merger of Community executives, it might
now be possible for the bargaining that takes place between Mem-
ber States to include as a trade factor the goals and programs of
Euratom, with concessions being made in other sectors in return
for reciprocation in the nuclear field. Since there is a disparity in
the capabilities of the participating Member States,5" some means
must be found for making agreement mutually acceptable. Fur-
ther, this must be done while maintaining the three distinct Com-
munities with three Treaties which still must be interpreted in light
of the philosophy upon which they are based. The hope is, how-
ever, that the unitary execution of the three Treaties will ". . . fa-
cilitate the consistent and co-ordinated development of the Com-
munity's legal order."'"
This, in turn, raises questions as to the international legal
personality of Euratom and its foreign relations power. One in-
terpretation of the foreign relations power of Euratom5" suggests
that it consists only of the sum of the foreign relations powers of
the Member States. On the other hand, it is suggested that Eura-
tom acts in its own right and conducts foreign relations on its own
account in accordance with Article 184 which confers on it a
50. id. at 54-65. "Current low-capacity States like Italy or the smaller
Euratom states perceive concessions to France or the Federal Republic simply as
the widening of an already unacceptable gap between themselves and the high-
capacity states. The latter, on the other hand, and especially France, view con-
cessions to low-capacity states as uneconomic allocations of limited resources
that tend to compromise the nuclear future of Europe." Id. at 58.
51. First General Report, supra note 41 at 463.
52. The foreign relations authority is found in Chap. X, Arts. 101-106.
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legal personality of its own.58 This does not mean, however, that
it has exclusive competence to act nor that it may take precedence
over other types of multi-national action. To the extent that the
Member States retain a concurrent jurisdiction over external nu-
clear relations, there is a possible area of Community/Member
State conflict. It must be remembered that the assumption of
international legal personality does not by itself confer supra-
national powers upon Euratom. Only to the extent that the Mem-
ber States can realize gains and benefits from any supranational
action on the part of Euratom will they be willing to conform to
its initiation of independent activity. Even though Euratom may
conclude association agreements with third countries, unions of
States, or international organizations, 54 these will only be success-
ful so long as they do not conflict with the basic domestic political
concerns of the Member States. Perhaps more important than
association agreements are those designed for cooperation with
foreign powers. The cooperative agreement with the United
States has proved highly successful and is continuing in a satis-
factory manner.58
While Euratom is recognized generally as having inter-
national personality, there is some question about the character
of the agreements it may make with bodies other than States or
53. Hahn, supra note 7 at 1046. "Yet a tendency to subordinate the
concomitants of the foreign-relations powers of the member states to supranational
supervision and control would seem to be in line with a teleological interpre-
tation of the treaty." Id. at 1029.
54. Euratom Treaty Art. 206. See Gaudet, Euratom 173-174, reprinted
from PROGRESS IN NUCLEAR ENERGY SstRs 10, Vols. 1 and 2-LAw AND AD-
MmNISTRATION, 1959.
55. Agreement for Cooperation, supra note 9. The single operative Article
of a preliminary agreement, May 29, 1958, provided that
The Parties will cooperate in programs for the advancement of the
peaceful applications of atomic energy. Such cooperation will be un-
dertaken from time to time pursuant to such terms and conditions as may
be agreed and shall be subject to all provisions of law respectively
applicable to the Parties. Specifically it is understood that under exist-
ing law the cooperation extended by the Government of the United States
of America will be undertaken pursuant to an Agreement for Coopera-
tion entered into in accordance with Section 123 of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, as amended.
In addition to this preliminary agreement there was also an extensive Memoran-
dum of Understanding concerning the proposed joint nuclear power program also
dated May 29, 1958. The Agreement, itself, had for its major purposes:
(a) To bring into operation within the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity (Euratom) large-scale power plants using nuclear reactors
of types on which would approach the competitive range of con-
ventional energy costs in Europe;
(b) To initiate immediately a joint research and development pro-
gram centered on these types of reactors. Id. at 55.
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other international organizations.
Many of the legal transactions of international organisa-
tions are, however, concluded with parties other than States
and international organisations; while such a transaction is not
necessarily governed by international law, there are already
important cases, and there may well be more, in which the
rules applicable to such transactions are international in char-
acter.56
While these agreements will not be considered treaties, they are
probably governed by international law. Such controversy 57 is
eliminated in Euratom by Article 184 which grants it legal per-
sonality, but to the extent that treaty-making power is not based
on international personality, this specific grant may not be entirely
successful. It has been suggested that the main requirements for
agreements negotiated with non-governmental bodies is that these
bodies should be of international standing and representative in
their field of activities.58
It might be possible to consider the term "treaty" in the
generic sense so as to include "conventions," "agreements," "modi
vivendi," "concordats," "declarations," and "pacts."5 9  Thus, to
the extent that Euratom enters into agreements with other bodies
which are functional and serve a useful purpose, it can be argued
that these agreements should come within the purview of the con-
cepts of international law. It should not be the precise terms of
the Euratom Treaty that confine its area of activity but rather a
functional interpretation of the goals sought to be accomplished.60
56. C. WILFRED JENKS, THE PROPER LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
256-257 (1962).
57. Jenks, The Legal Personality of International Organizations, 22 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 267-274 (1945). Jenks further asks whether it is necessary to
invoke the concept of legal personality for the purpose of defining the legal
capacity of international organizations. He concludes that regretfully this
concept must be used to ". . . define the status of public international organiza-
tion as legal entities." Id. at 271. For a critique of the concept of legal entity,
see A. NEKAM, THE PERSONALITY CONCEPT OF THE LEGAL ENTITY (1938).
58. J.W. SCHNEIDER, TREATY-MAKING POWER OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA-
TIONS 139 (1959). It is a further assertion of Schneider that the treaty-making
power is not based on international personality and that the international char-
acter of agreements concluded by organizations is recognized without recourse
to the personality of the organization. Id. at 129.
59. Jones, International Agreements Other Than Inter-State Treaties-Mod-
ern Developments, 21 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 111, 115 (1944).
60. "It is not so much the express provisions or powers in a constitution
which guarantee its effectiveness and thereby its survival but the use to which
these are put through a functional interpretation of both express and implied
stipulations." K. HOLLOWAY, MODERN TRENDS IN TREATY LAW 699 (1967).
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There are a number of examples of Euratom activities that
indicate a supranational competence to varying degrees. The prin-
cipal agreements for cooperation concluded by Euratom, includ-
ing agreements with the United States, The United Kingdom, and
Canada have not been seriously questioned in any quarter and
there has been a rise in the number of non-Member States that
have diplomatic missions accredited to Euratom. 61 The coopera-
tive arrangements concluded with the United States Atomic En-
ergy Commission on proven-type reactors have satisfactorily devel-
oped and an estimate of plutonium needs through 1971 has been
coupled with implementation procedures to ensure that all neces-
sary plutonium will be supplied through the Euratom/United
States Agreement for Cooperation. As an example of the func-
tional approach to the powers of the organization, it is reported
that while Belgium and The Netherlands have not yet been in-
cluded in the Euratom/United States Atomic Energy Commission
Agreement of 25 May 1964, that since April 1966 ". . . the two
associates have been enjoying the de facto benefit of information
exchanged under the agreement. '62
Further, the Commission participates in the work of the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development, particu-
larly on the committees on energy and electricity, science policy,
cooperation in research, and scientific and technical manpower.
There is also cooperation between Euratom and the European
Nuclear Energy Agency, particularly concerning Euratom partici-
pation in the work of ENEA and its Steering Committee in ac-
cordance with Additional Protocol No. 1 to the OECD Conven-
tion and Article 21 of the Council's decision setting up ENEA.63
There has also been a Commission observer at the General Con-
ference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in
61. These countries include: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, Denmark, Finland, Gabon, Greece, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Ivory Coast,
Japan, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Upper Volta, and Venezuela. For a
discussion of the Euratom Agreements, see Background Note, Euratom's Ex-
ternal Relations, The Commission, Official Spokesman's Group, EUR/C/608/62e,
Brussels, Feb. 7, 1962.
62. Tenth General Report on the Activities of the Community, 82, Euro-
pean Atomic Energy Community, Euratom, The Commission, April 1967.
63. The second renewal of the DRAGON Agreement occurred on April 1,
1966, providing for expenditures of 4.35 million u.a., 47% to be carried by
Euratom over a period from April 1, 1967 to Dec. 31, 1967. There has also
been a proposal for a further renewal up until March 31, 1970. id. at 83.
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Vienna, September 21-28, 1966. The trend here is towards a
more concrete relationship particularly regarding nuclear safe-
guards and controls. At the beginning of 1967, the United States
government notified Euratom of certain aspects of the draft treaty
on the non-proliferation of nuclear armaments which was discussed
in the context of concern over whether any signature by certain
Member States might introduce factors of discrimination or di-
version inside the Community through the wording of the control
clauses of such a treaty. Finally, Euratom has standing rela-
tionships with the International Labour Organization, the World
Health Organization, the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization, the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission,
and the Council of Europe.64
At the present time Euratom continues to exist despite the
state of continued crisis that has attended its activities during the
past three years. The 1969 Research Programme and Budget was
adopted by the Community's Council of Ministers on March 4,
1969, and earlier in the year the European Parliament's Commit-
tee on Energy, Research and Atomic Problems discussed the present
state and the prospects of the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity wherein the general opinion was that Euratom should
concentrate more on industrial ends.6 5 Finally, the Commission
will present to the Council before July 1, 1969, its proposals for a
"Multiannual Research and Training Programme for Euratom"
which it is hoped will aid in the development of a coordinated in-
dustrial policy in the nuclear field. 66
It is hoped that the policy whereby some Member States do
not support all projects will be eliminated in the near future:
The pros and cons are open to discussion, but the system un-
der which half the programmes are financed by everybody
and the other half only by those actively concerned is a de-
testable one and profoundly dangerous for our Community. 67
64. Id. at 85. Several bilateral agreements entered into by Member States
prior to the Treaty's coming into force have expired and have not been renewed.
The countries involved are Belgium/U.S., Belgium/U.K., Federal Republic of
Germany/U.K., and France/U.S.
65. Research and Technology, Bulletin published by the Commission of the
European Communities, 2, Brussels, Mar. 5, 1969, No. 9.
66. Id. at 2 of No. 3; Id. at 1 of No. 4.
67. Address by M. Jean Rey, President of the Commission of the Com-
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Thus, the future of Euratom continues to be uncertain. The
extent to which Euratom is a supranational entity will continue to
be determined partially by the provisions of the Treaty modified
by various modes of interpretation which differ primarily as to
whether implied powers are to be recognized. Matters such as
the ability of Euratom to conduct foreign affairs in the nuclear
field, the validity of its sanctioning processes and their extra-terri-
torial effect, and the desirability of a more effective inspection and
control system, all are matters upon which further Treaty inter-
pretation will be provided by Member States and the administra-
tors of the Community. The concept of supranationalism will also
be considered in terms of structural functionalism with emphasis
given to the context of Community development-including such
matters as the realization of the interests of American private busi-
ness concerns, the continual state of crisis in the Community itself,
the disparity in the nuclear capabilities of the Member States, and
the isolated votes in the Council over strong national objection that
indicate the beginning of a supranational capability-with the re-
sult that pragmatism will contribute to an over-all understanding
of the immediate problems.
In sum, it would appear that Euratom does not possess, to
any great extent, the attributes of supranationalism. One of the
reasons for this centers around the military implications of any nu-
clear research which has caused Member States to be over-cautious
in entering into cooperative ventures, but more important is the
absence of a developed sense of mutual shared expectations within
which the provisions of the Treaty can be interpreted. If defer-
ence is given to the genuine shared expectations of the Member
States, then there is a great likelihood of the development of an
enlarged area of cooperation. Where the Treaty is ambiguous, the
expectations of the parties should be considered and given effect
unless they conflict with basic concepts of Community order and
stability. 8 To facilitate this approach it will be necessary to de-
velop a realization on the part of Member States that it is beneficial
to their respective national interests to cooperate in the area of
68. "The role of interpretation is precisely the nurturing of confidence by
seeking to ascertain and to effectuate in greatest measure the expectations of
agreement-makers." M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL, and J. MILLER, THE INTER-
PRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 394-95 (1967). See also,
Information Memo, Euratom's Future Activity, 1, April 30, 1969. P-24, Com-
mission of the European Communities.
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nuclear research for the furtherance of European integration and
eventual consolidation. In the absence of such a realization, the
limits of supranationalism discussed herein will prove determina-
tive and Euratom as a supranational entity will fail and with it the
hopes for successful European federalism.
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